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THE MATHESON COALITION
by Becky Snow
In political circl~, the State of Utah is often referred to as a
"hive of conservatism. 11
Several factors seem to indicate that this
reputation is well deserved. For example, recent survey data indicate
that 54 percent of the voters in the state identify themselves as either
strong, not so strong, or leaning Republicans--this is far above the
national average of ~3 percent Republican identifiers as estimated by
Gallup opinion polls.
Also, many political observers feel that Utah 1 s
all Republican Washington delegation currently constitutes the most
conservative team in Congress.
Additionally, in the Presidential
Election of 1980, Jimmy Cart:fr, the Democratic incumbent, received only
21 percent of the Utah vote.
Voting in intrastate politics, however, is a bit different. The
governorship has been controlled for the past sixteen years by the
Democrats. Three-term Democratic Governor Calvin Rampton preceded the
current Democratic chief state executive, Scott Matheson.
A random
sample of Utah voters who exited from the polls this November were asked
to indicate their general attitude toward several political figures. As
indicated below, data gathered in this "KBYU and Utah Colleges Exit
Survey" (see Appendix) indicates that of all political figures tested,
Governor Matheson is the most favorably perceived politician in the
state.
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Matheson 1 s second term expires in January of 1985 and there is some
speculation about his running for a third term. Should he decide to
run, his chances for reelection appear to be excellent.
The
favorability ratings, however, present somewhat of an an omaly .
How can
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a Democratic Governor be the most popular political figure in an
overwhelmingly conservative Republican state?
This paper is an attempt to answer that question by examining
additional survey data in an effort to explain or locate part of the
source of Matheson's popularity.
Political scientists generally believe that there are three factors
which can explain an individual's vote--the long-term factor of party
identification, and the short-term variables of issues and candidate
appea 1.
In their book The Changing American Voter, Nie, Verba and
Petrocik detail their extensive study of voters and elections from 1964
to 1976.
During the survey stage of their research effort, these
analysts asked respondents open-ended questions which were designed to
predict the respondent's vote.
When asked to evaluate political
candidates, respondents mentioned the candidate's personality, party
affilia ion, or issue positions as reasons for liking or disliking the
person.
Drawing from these findings, I expected to see that party
affiliation, issue positions, and personal appeal would be factors in
explaining the high favorability rating of Scott Matheson.

4

Party Identification
Party identification is usually viewed as "a psychological
attachment or feeling of loyalty to one political party that develops
during childhood and becomes more intense the longer one is identified
5
with the party. 11
One of the arguments of The American Voter is that
because parties are the most enduring elements of the political
environment, they often serve as a gerceptua 1 screen through which the
elements of politics are evaluated.
Campbell tells us that the very
property of being pro-candidate X or anti-candidate Y, or even of
viewing a political leader favorably or unfavorably, is inevitably
linked to attitudes within a political system that is polarized by two
parties. We should assume, he says, "that public feeling would vary
along this type of two-v lued dimension imposed on political attitudes
1
by our two party system. 11
This theory is exemplified by data on Matheson's popularity
ratings. Below are results of crosstabulations of a voter's rating of
Matheson as favorable or unfavorable, and this individual's party
identification.
I have also shown results for the same cross
tabulations for Reagan's favorable/unfavorable rating.
In this way we
can compare the most popular Democrat with the most popular Republican
in the state.
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Table 2
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These data show that Matheson did indeed receive the hi~hest
percentage of favorable ratings from the Democratic identifiers by far,
and Reagan received the highest percentage of unfavorable ratings from
this same group. The figures for the Republican identifiers were vice
versa. The numbers speak for themselves and it is easy to see that
party identification is definitely a factor. Clearly, Matheson received
strong support from the Democrats and Independents, but he also had a 60
percent favorability rate among strong Republicans. We know, then, that
this is not the only variable analysis that needs to be done to explain
Matheson's popularity. If party identification was the only variable
that influenced voter perception, Republicans would always dominate the
popularity scales, as the Democratic party is the minority party in
Utah.
This same cross tabulation (examining vertical rather than
horizontal figures) reveals the fact that of the voters who rated
Matheson favorably, 51 percent, a slight majority, were Republican
identifiers. At least half of the people with whom he is popular
identify themselves with the opposite political party.
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It is also instructive to note from corner percentaging that 38
percent of all voters were Republican identifiers who voted favorably
for Matheson, 29 percent of all voters were Democrats who favored him,
and only 8 percent were pure Independents.
Obviously, party identification predisposes a voter to think the
way that he does, but we need to go beyond this for an explanation of
Matheson's popularity. These results are in line with Nie's findings
that the frequency with which politicians are preferred on 8he basis of
party alone has declined drastically in the past few years.
Also, the
proportion of voters with a party affiliation--those for whom party
identi ication can play a role in preferencing--is lower than in earlier
years.
To account for voter preferences, then, particularly those of
citizens who cross party lines, or those Independents who have no party
inclinations, we must examine other influences.

9

Issues
Stephen Hess states that "American's i gnoranc of issues is
probably the best documented tenet of voting research." 10 Yet classical
democratic theorists feel that issues should play the decisive role in
electoral preference. The citizen should make a rational decision
between alternatives on the basis of accurate issues information. But,
how can issues even play a role, much less play the decisive role in
political preferences, if Americans don't know anything about them?
Bernard Berelson was one of the first political analysts to
question the competence of the average voter. He did extensive work
analyzing voter's knowledge of two hotly contested issues of the 1948
Presidential campaign. Only 16 percent of his sample knew the correct
stances of both candidates on both issues, while just 33 percent of
those surveyed knew only one position of one Cffdidate. Most knew none
of the issue positions of either candidate.
Other scholars, most
notably Angus Campbell in The American Voter, presented further evidence
which indicated the issue ignorance of the American electorate.
These studies, however, focused on the electorate of the 1950s.
Since that time, analysts who base their arguments on more recent
elections have challenged those findings. One of the most prominent of
these challengers was V. 0. Key. He asserted that voters are reasonable
in their actions, and based this contention on research he had done
16

which indicated that switchers (those who voted for candidates
representing different parties in successive presidential elections)
tended to move to the party closest to the voter's own position on some
important issue. Key's findings were limited, but others expanded on
his idea. Natchez and Bupp theorized that the power of issue voting was
underestimated by aggregate voting figures--different issues are
important to different people, and the aggregate figures were hiding any
relationship that might exist. They placed voters into "issue publics"
on the basis of issues important to them, and then examined the
relationship between issue position and vote. The_)f found that issues
were important in vote choice among issue publics. 4 In The Changi n~
American Voter, Nie, Verba, and Petroci k show that from 1964 to 197
voting on the basis of Pf§tY affiliation declined, and voting on the
basis of issues increased.
Most scholars currently believe that there
can be such a thing as issue preferencing--but it is not too common.
Issues can be important to vote choice if several prerequisites are met:
(1) a voter must cognize the issue, (2) the issue must arouse some
minimal intensity of feeling in the voter, (3) he must take a stand on
the issue, and (4) he must perceive that one party or person better
represents his position. "W1is gives him a reason to opt for one party
or person over another. 1
Consider the following facts:
October
national and state une~~loyment figures were in double digits and were
the highest since 1941 ; Gallup pollsters indicated that unemr~oyment
was (and is) the issue most on the minds of Americans ; the
unemployment rate was a key part of campaign rhetoric in the 1982
elections; there was an intensity of feeling on this subject and
finally, the two parties have divergent approaches to dealing with the
problem of unemployment. Because of these considerations, I theorized
that Matheson's popularity rating may have been boosted by those who
were highly concerned about this issue and who favored the Democratic
approach.
My data analysis indicates that people with strong feelings on the
issue of jobs and unemployment may have contributed to Matheson's
favorable rating. I cross tabulated answers to a question that asked
respondents which issues they felt were the most important in deciding
their vote with results from a question asking them to rate Matheson
favorably or unfavorably.
I controlled for party identification,
believing that Democratic party identification would predispose some
voters to feel that jobs and unemployment was the most important issue
in this election. The results were about as I had expected. Fifty-four
percent of all Democratic party identifiers felt that jobs and
unemployment were the major issue underlying their preferences. Of that
group, 85 percent, or 47 percent of all Democratic identifiers, thought
that jobs and unemployment were the major issue and they rated Matheson
favorably at the same time. Of those who identified themselves as pure
Independents, 33 percent felt that jobs and unemployment were the most
important issue, and of those, 86 percent, or 29 percent of a 11 pure
Independents, thought that jobs and unemployment were the major issue
and rated Matheson favorably at the same time.
But, when we turn to the cross tabulations for those who are
Republicans, things are quite different.
Only 9 percent of the
Republican party identifiers felt that jobs and unemployment were a
major issue. Of that group 79 percent, or 7 percent of all Republicans,
thought that this was the major issue and voted for Matheson.
17

Table 4
Democrat
Voted Favorably for
Matheson and thought
jobs and unemployment
was one of the major
issues

85 *

Voted Favorably for
Reagan and thought
jobs and unemployment
was one of the major
issues
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86
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10
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7
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* The numbers in this position in the graph cells are percentages of the number
of people who voted favorably for the politician, who thought jobs and
unemployment was one of the major issues, and who identified with one of the
three parties. In other words, these are horizontal percentage figures.
**The numbers in this position indicate the total percentaqe of the three groups
of party identifiers who voted favorably for the politician, and who thought
jobs and unemployment was one of the major issues. These are the vertical
percentage figures.

This picture seems to reflect again the importance of party
identification in determining the concerns of Democratic and Republican
voters, but it takes on additional value when we compare it with cross
tabulations of important issues and popularity ratings for Reagan, the
most popular Republican, again controlling for party identification.
Fifty-five percent of the Democrats felt that jobs and unemployment were
the most salient issue and of these, 18 percent, or 10 percent of a 11
Democratic party identifiers, thought jobs were the most important issue
and rated Reagan favorably at the same time. Of those who identify
themselves as pure Independents, 33 percent believed that jobs and
unemployment were the key issue--of these, 48 percent, or only 16
percent of all pure Independents who thought that jobs were the main
issue also rated Reagan favorably.
Figures for the 8 percent of
Republican party identifiers who felt that jobs and unemployment were
the key issue are not surprising. Ninety-six percent, or almost all 8
percent of these Republicans, had a favorable impression of Reagan. The
difference here that is noteworthy is in the category of Independent
identifiers who felt that jobs and unemployment were the most salient
issue--86 percent voted favorably for Matheson, while only 48 percent
voted favorably for Reagan. For Independent voters, at least, the
popularity ratings appear to have some issue content. Possibly this
issue-oriented group can account for a little of Matheson's popularity,
but the support these individuals lend doesn't begin to explain
Matheson's overwhelmingly favorable rating.
In The Political Behavior of the American Electorate, Flanigan and
Zingale state that because people are not familiar with the issues and
they are not offered a polarized choice by parties or politicians, they
adopt the position of their favorii 9 politician.
In essence, the
politician provides issue leadership.
The real determinant of voter
preference, then, is not issue orientation, but candidate/politician
appeal.
Possibly, Matheson's popularity can be explained by his
personal appeal.
18

Personal Appeal
As was discussed earlier, Natchez and Bupp found that issue voting
occurred in issue publics. However, they did not deny the importance of
partisan affiliations or of the personal appeal of politicians in
preferencing decision. In fact, they asserted that candidate/politician
ima~e wa~ substantially more important than issues in influencing these
choices. 0
The findings of many other scholars support this proposition.
Campbell's work in The American Voter indicates that about 75 percent of
all the votes for President in 1956 could be predicted on th~ basis of
attitudes toward the personal cha racteri sti cs of Eisenhower. 1 In The
Changing American Voter the authors assert that in 1976, voting on the
basis of party affiliation increased (from what it had been from 1964 to
1972) and simultaneously, voting on the basis of issues decreased. The
1976 Election results did not represent a full return to the pre-1964
elections--elections which the authors feel demonstrated an overriding
voter concern with candidate personality. The issues appeared to lose
much of their power over the vote, but party identification as an
influence only recovered some of its power. This change, they feel, was
due to the changing cast of political characters. The major debate
between Carter and Ford was not a difference in policy goals, but it was
a question of who was more competent to achieve these policy goals.
Both candidates played down the issues because polls seemed to indicate
that the voters were more interested in the ~haracter of the candidates.
They were interested in personal qualities. 2
Gerald Pomper's research lends additional credibility to this
conclusion.
In 1972, his research team asked voters a series of
open-ended questions designed to get respondents to freely discuss
candidates and political parties.
Respondents' remarks were then
classified as favorable or unfavorable. A majority of the comments made
(both positive and negative) dealt with strictly personal candidate
attributes and characteristics. Pamper believes that voters perceived
Senator McGovern to be deficient in leadership abilities and
character--according to Pamper, 21ck of positive candidate appeal was
the reason for McGovern's defeat.
Similarly, Patton and Kaericher conducted two separate supporting
experiments--one in which they surveyed college students' opinions
concerning purposefully created (fictional) candidates, and another
study in which they questioned registered voters with regards to actual
candidates. For both samples, the candidate who was more credible,
likeable, and demographically s1214ilar to the electorate got
significantly more favorable ratings.
Joseph P. Forgas challenged the findings of other analysts on this
topic. He felt that there were "at 25 ibute dimensions that were used to
differentiate between politicians,"
but he felt that the results of
other studies were inaccurate because they were obtained within the
context of a volatile political situation (an election) and thus did not
adequately reflect the multidimensional complexity of political
judgments. He also felt that the dimensions of candidate appeal were
not psychologically unique--personal appeal and issue appeal are often
interrelated and it is impossible to tell if the public shows approval
of a spokesman or of the spokesman's philosophy. To correct for these
things, Forgas studied political leader appeal outside of the context of
an election, and he used INDISCAL analysis to separate policy factors
19

from personality factors. He analysis showed, in accordance with the
other studies, the personal qualities of politicians (likeability,
flexibility, :Afld goodness) emerged as salient dimensions of political
preferencing.
What, then, are these personal attributes that affect the
popularity of a politician? Hess tells us that a self-selective process
is as active in the political field as it is in any other occupational
area. Popular and successful politicians have similar aptitudes, skills
and personalities just as popular doctors do. Also, doctors are more
likely to be like other doctors tha~fhey are to be like engineers--this
is also the case with politicians.
But, as with anythizW else, the
stereotype of a perfect, popular politician does not exist.
Numerous scholars, however, have given listings of qualities that
the electorate perceives positively in a politician. Clinton Rossiter
tells us that the public likes self-made men who are cultural middle
brows ( they 1 i ke both sports and concerts), who have achieved, a re
friendly, intelligent (though not intellectual), eloquent, of good moral
repute, will'!t9g to serve faithfuTly, and who are moderate in their views
and tastes.
Campbell adds that popular politicians (such as
Eisenhower) are good leaders, effective administrators, decisive, and
independent. They know how to handle people, they are inspiring, a
little idealistic, patriotic, kind, warm,
ligious and likeable. Most
of all, they are sincere men of integrity. 30 Polsby and Wildavsky feel
that in addition to these other qualities, a politician will be both
popular and effective if he is mature, and outwardly comfortable in any
situation. They note, however, that a politician need not have all of
these characteristics to ~1 popular--in fact, he should not have them
all or he will be suspect.
As the previous listing indicates, an individual faced with the
problem of judging a candidate's qualifications or a political leader's
performance may be divided between assessing a number of attributes.
But what characteristics are most important? A person who was deeply
affected by the Watergate scanda 1 may pl ace a premium on the persona 1
characteristic of honesty or integrity. If one is poor or unemployed,
he may weight the socioeconomic background of the politician more
heavily.
T. L. Saaty and J. P. Bennett try to reduce these
multidimensional considerations into a hierarchy of a one-dimensional
scale which will explain the electorate's responses to objective
personality criterion.
The authors of this theory of analytical
hierarchies use what they call an "eigenvector" approach to evaluate
voters' priority setting measures. They judge politicians by personal
attributes on a scale as follows:
(Those characteristics with the
highest eigenvector values are the most significant attributes.)
Attribute
Personal integrity
quality of moral standards, trustworthiness
Past performance
quality of role fulfillment, regardless of what
that role was
Experience
past office holding or related activities

Eigenvector
.2066
.1697
.1688
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Honesty
lawfulness in public life, law abidingness
Charisma
personal leadership qualities inspiring
enthusiasm and support
Glamour
charm, allure, personal attractiveness,
association with the attractive

.1678
.0427
.0252

Saaty and Bennett believe that individuals intuitively resort to a
similar simplifying and weighting process (though hardly as systematic
o~ rigi9~ to reach an overall appraisal and rating of political
figures.
Unfortunately, I am unable to apply or test the Saaty/Bennett model
to data about the popular characteristics of Matheson. When one is
conducting an exit po 11, such as the II KB YU/Utah Co 11 eges Survey, 11 he is
severely limited in the amount of time that he is reasonably allowed to
spend with each respondent.
For this reason, open-ended questions
designed to examine the source of individual politicians' popularity, or
questions which would explore the importance of Matheson's personality
traits were not included in the survey.
My only recourse, then, is to try to analyze Governor Matheson's
popularity in another way--an analysis that I can support with empirical
evidence. Donald Stokes tells us that the word 11 appeal 11 in the term
personal or candidate appeal implies more than something about the
candidate/politician himself; it also implies something about the
dispositions of the electorate. It is easy to see why Eisenhower was so
popular if one understands the dominant values and preferences of the
people in American society at that time. But one can also see that
Eisenhower would not have been as popular before an electorate
consisting only of American political science professors--a group much
less impressed by a milffary conqueror and less susceptible to the
appeal of personal charm.
Eugene J. Watts tested the assumption that in democratic societies
office seekers and office holders are viewed favorably by the electorate
because they possess certain attributes. He attempted to measure and
define this process of "social filtering." Watts found, as have other 34
that a combination of certain attributes does carry public favor.
But, applying Stokes' concept, wouldn't it logically follow that the
electorate who establish and constitute this filter, or groups within
the electorate, also share certain attributes?
We know from the work of Paul Lazarsfeld, and others, that
political preferencing is essentially a social or group experience.
People who live in the same environment, under similar conditions, and
belong to the same general groups are likely to develop similar needs
and attitudes. They see the political world through the same pair of
colored glasses. They will like the same political candidates--that is,
if they are aware of the goals of their own group and i!s they pay
attention to the politicians' actions, goals, and intentions.
Operating under this supposition I tried to locate and analyze the
demographic composition of Matheson's support among Utahns--the Matheson
coalition. Cross-tabular analysis of demographic considerations and
favorability ratings for each of the politicians tested yields the
following results:
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Table 5

DEMOGRAPHIC COMPOSITION OF VOTERS BY FAVORABLE POL~TICIAN RATINGS
the politicians favorably. )
( All numbers shown are percentages of those in each group who rated
Matheson

Reagan

Garn

Bush

Watt

Mondale

Carter

Kenned·

Favorability Rating

74

72

7l

49

32

32

28

24

Sex:
Male
Female

73
74

74
69

74
69

54
42

40
22

3l
33

27
29

22
22

73
73
77

74

58
62
73
76

39
45
46
57

38
32
28
37

41
34
31
30

43
34
22
27

38

72

57
65
76

7l
7l

59
73

43
45
45
54
62

23
25
32
38
41

33
32
30
36
25

36
33
27
26
19

30
27
23
22
12

Education:
No high school diploma
Completed high school
Some college
Four years of college
Income:
Under $10,000
$10 ,000-14,999
$15,000-24,999
$25,000-50,000
$50,000

34

18
20

74

72

77
72

74

84

65
65
69
76
80

Age:
18-24
25-34
35-44
45-54
55-64
65+

67
72
72
78
74
79

79
72
73
68
65
7l

7l
68
73
74
70
73

44
47
51
47
51
58

17
26
36
39
35
49

28
28
31
34
37
44

18
25
26
26
34
4l

16
24
24
23
26
34

Those unemployed in
the last 12 months

74

62

61

40

28

32

27

26

Religion:
Protestant
Catholic
Mormon
Jewish
No preference

81
79
7l
78
88

51
43
82
60
30

51
46
80
46
34

51
49
50
36
36

25
18
37
27
12

44
46
28
36
47

38
43
23
36
46

33
46
17
36
49

The table seems to indicate that, although there was basically no
difference between the percentage of men and women in their rating of
Matheson, women rated him slightly more favorably than they did other
candidates. J. Keith Melville suggested that this relationship might be
due to Matheson 1 s stances against the old MX missile basing plan and the
storage of nerve gas bombs in Utah. Women are very discriminating
voters, but would be attracted by these pos~tions, Melville feels,
because they are pro-life, pro-family stances.
Having learned from
Wolfinger and Rosenstone that almost any electoral differences between
men and women can be accounted for by :PJifferences in other demographic
variables--most notably education level --I ran another test using both
education and party identification (the ever-present voter perceptual
filter) as control variables. This analysis confirmed the fact that men
and women within education and party categories made very similar
preference ratings. There was no regular pattern to their occasional
differences. Women in the same education and party identification
categories do generally rate Matheson more favorably than they do other
candidates--but there is only a slight difference. Most of the variance
can be explained by party identification and the Independent vote. It
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appears that sex may play a small role in determining rating as far as
the Independents (regardless of education categories) are concerned.
Comparing the figures for Scott Matheson and Ronald Reagan, a male
Independent would rate either politician favorably 75 percent of the
time. A female Independent would rate Matheson favorably 86 percent of
the time, and Reagan would receive only 68 percent favorable ratings.
Therefore, as far as Independents are concerned, Keith Melville's
pro-family theory may be valid.
Table 6
WOMEN
Rated Matheson Favorably:
No High
School Diploma
Democrat

Independent
Republican
Rated Reagan

Democrat

Independent
Republican

Completed
High School

Some
College

Four y ears
of College

74%

84

95

94

so

86

88

$!8

66

76

75

24

23

29

22

100

63

72

64

100

99

98

9$!

45
a v ,.•1.L a...J .L Y

:

Next, I examined the factor of education.
It appears from the
demographic chart (Table 5) that Matheson is most popular with those who
have attended four years of college or more. This is as would be
expected not only because the highly educated are characterized as being
more liberal, but also because the more educated are the most likely to
defect from their party leanings and vote for the person rather than the
party. The educated would be the best informed. They are more likely
to know what Matheson is doing in office. They would know if he is
competent, if he has researched his issue positions, if he is evenhanded
in his judgments, and if he has pursued the best interests of the state.
The data supports this idea quite well.
Controlling for party
identification, we can see that the more educated groups were more apt
to rate Matheson favorably than were the less educated. It is important
to note the significant amount of positive favorabil ity support that
Matheson got from the college educated--thi s group ( those who had had
either some or four years of college) constituted 63 percent of his
Democratic support, 69 percent of his Independent support, and 79
percent of his Republican backing. Conversely, the college educated
made up only 59 percent of Reagan's Democratic backing, 71 percent of
his Independent support, and, interestingly, 78 percent of his
Republican support. Therefore, a Republican who had attended college
was just as likely to rate Matheson favorably as he was to rate Reagan
favorably.
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Table 7

Percentages of those voting favorabl y for the politicians :
Matheson

Reagan
Dem.

Indep.

Rep.

Dem .

No High School
Diploma

75

75

59

29

100

93

Completed
High School

84

66

66

23

60

99

Some College

89

77

65

25

69

42

Four years of
College

94

86

68

23

66

98

Indei:,.

Re;,.

Next, I checked the demographic characteristics of income and age.
As the demographic chart (Table 5) indicates, Matheson got most support
from the group of people who had incomes ranging from $25,000 to
$50,000. He also got heavily favorable ratings from those voters who
were 65 years of age and older. The income relationship was a bit
perplexing to me. But, Matheson's wife is very active in senior citizen
causes, so I could understand their rating him very favorably. However,
I checked the relationship in both demographic categories by cross
tabulating them with the favorability ratings again--this time
controlling for both education and party identification.
Both
previously apparent relationships were entirely explainable by the two
control variables.
Those who had been unemployed at some time in the past 12 months
rated Matheson much more positively than they rated other political
figures, according to Table 5. But, mostly Democrats must have been the
unemployed individuals in this state, because when we controlled this
analysis by party affiliation, no true relationship existed between
employment status and favorability relationships. Only the Independents
appeared to be affected by this factor. Eighty-one percent of the
unemployed Independents favored Matheson while just 53 percent rated
Reagan favorably.
It has been said that in the State of Ut~, Republican political
views are equated with LOS Church doctrine.
The fact that the
Democratic Governor (though technically he is LOS) is rated least
favorably by the Mormon voters, according to Table 5, lends some
credibility to this statement. But before making any conclusions, I
again cross tabulated the religion data by the favorability data, and
this time controlled for party identification. Instead of eliminating
apparent relationships as before, this control variable highlighted the
importance of religious affiliation in questions of political
favorability in Utah. The table below shows the tremendous effect that
party identification can have on perception, but note that in all party
affiliation categories the Protestants and those who had no preference
or no religious affiliation rated Matheson more favorably than did the
Mormons. ( No cone 1us ions were drawn about Jewish voters because our
sample contained only seven such individuals.) These figures are even
more informative when they are compared with the same numerical analysis
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for Reagan. Here, Mormons in every political identification category
rate Reagan favorably much more frequently than do members of any other
religious group. Since the vast majority of respondents (74 percent)
were Mormon, we might say that this particular group escalated Reagan's
favorability rating and held Matheson's down slightly. Note also the
wide gap between the Independent Mormons' fa vorabi 1ity percentage ( for
Reagan) and the favorability percentage of all of the other religious
groups i n the category.
Table 8
Per c entages o f those v oting favora bly f o r t he p oli t i cians :
Reagan

Math eson
De m.
Pr o testant
Ca tholic
Mormon
J e wish
No p reference
Pre f er not
to sa y

I n dep .

Reo .

91

82

84

71

86

Dem.

I ndep .

Rep .

71

10

36

9_4

68

23

29

93

74

65

31

80

98

80

100

67

20

100

100

92

82

81

15

41

94

88

10 0

100

14

40

100

Nie, Verba, and Petrocik found that white Protestants outside of
the South have moved slightly farther to the right in the past few
years. This group had been as solidly Republican as white Southerners
had been Democratic. Our data indicates that this may hold true for the
Protestants in Utah. The authors of The Changing American Voter al so
state that Catholics and Jews are minorities with a traditional
Democratic preference (though recently Catholics have become more even
divided between the parties and Jews have moved farther to the left).
If the authors were so inclined, our data indicates that as far as
favorability ratings are concerned, they could add Mormons to their list
of minorities with a traditional preference--Republican.

4~

Conclusion
We can say, then, that certain groups of voters (Democrats, those
Independents concerned with jobs and unemployment , Independent women,
the college educated, and members of Utah's religious minorit i es) more
heavily favor Scott Matheson and thereby contribute to his high
favorable rating. These groups, however, do not account entirely for
the popularity ratings of Matheson. To do this, we would need to gather
additional data--we would need to ask voters not simply to rate
politicians on a favorability scale, but to tell us why they rated the
individuals the way that they did. Maybe the voters like Matheson
because he isn't a political opportunist, or because he is sincere, he's
an underdog as a Democrat in this state, he doesn't wear his re l igi on on
his sleeve, _he answers his mail, and he's "down to earth." These may
not be considerations at all. At this time, then, the question that has
been raised cannot be fully answered.
But research done to this point
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seems to indicate that the key to the riddle lies in Matheson's personal
appeal.
The idea of political preferencing by personal appeal is disturbing
to some. In referring to the Presidency, James David Barber says that
"it is not comfortable to ~ave to rely on the character of a man for the
health of our democracy." 4 Still, voting or preferencing on the basis
of personal character can be seen as a rational decision making process.
I believe that Utah voters have made a rational preference decision
regarding Scott Matheson. We usually think of rational decision making
in politics only in terms of issue voting. But, can't voters be
considered just as rational if they make their preferencing or candidate
selection with the idea that one person will or does carry out
acceptable policies more se'1fjbly, efficiently, honestly, and
competently than others would.
Stanley Kelley felt that these
questions of personal character are especially important in American
politics since our system is not characterized by strict political party
discipline. He believes that an individual's personality has great
impact on his conduct as an office holder--especially on\~ state and
local levels where political officials are less restricted.
I concur with Stephen Hess, who feels that if our system cannot
equally test all of the characteristics that are necessary for success
in public office, then the voter in his political decision making
process should give priority to the personal attributes of politicians.
These characteristics are the most immutable--they are the least likely
to change as problems arise in office. Elected officials can become
better political executives, they can (and often do) change their issue
positioij~ and party affiliations, but they cannot become better
people.
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APPENDIX

EXIT SURVEY
Sponsored by KBYU and Utah Colleges
1. In the Senatorial race who did you just vote for?
Orrin Hatch, Republican
~9~·2 0 Ted Wilson, Democrat
/ =k; 3·O Someone else
- SO Did not vote for Senator
- 80 Do not remember
2 1"90 Prefer not to say

7. Which issues were most important in deciding how you

::-l'n O

voted today?
1z:J,1.O Interest rates

2,4

2-0 Jobs and unemployment

1L½ 3-0 Inflation
1 4.Q Defense spending

(14) '1..9 5.Q Maintaining Ronald Reagan's economic polic ies
9 6-0 Social Security
l.D 7 .O Other
(221

2. Was your choice for senator mostly a vote:
} ·7'i1 O In favor of your candidate
1o 20 Against his opponents
1 3-0 A random selection
t 9.Q Prefer not to say

8. In the election today there were four ballot propositions.
How much attention did you pay to news and information
(15)
about these propositions?
-----------------------1-+1 %
10 A lot
'-132-0 Some
3. When did you make your final decision about your vote
\ 1.. 3.Q A Little
(23)
for senator?
4 4.Q None
~" 1.Q Today
2-0 Over the weekend
9. How did you just vote on Proposition 1 the revenue and
) 3.Q During the past week
, 4.Q 2-3 weeks ago
taxation article revision?
r sn 4-5 weeks ago
~2%1-0 For
, SO Aug-Sept
33 2-0 Against
3-0 Did not vote on this proposition
7 7 0 June/ July
1 4.Q Cannot remember how I voted
3 8.Q before June
24 ]
(16) · 3 9.Q Prefer not to say
..: 90 Prefer not to say

z.

0. What was your most important source of information on
Proposition 1?
2.41~1.0 Television
11 2-0 Radio
·r , 3-0 Newspaper
12., 4.Q Word-of-mouth
(17) 1i.:; 5.Q Voter Pamphlet
60 Some other source
80 Didn 't pay much attention to the propos itions
[251
5C. In the U.S. Representative race who did you just vote
for?
58
5A
:'l,11 O Hank Huish, Independent +-f";'o ?.:l~j iDi "lo ·r1an:e
1. When did you make your final decision about your vot e
t 2!7 Howard Nielson , Republican 53 Mam.:.ot!: 35" DLr k..s
on Proposition 1?
3.r. Someone else
"2fY/,1 O Today
SO Did not vote for U.S. Representative H 2J7 Over the weekend
8.n Do not remember
2..Jp 3n During the past week
; 9.1 , Prefer not to say
3
(20) :.:3 40 2-3 weeks ago
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -1 i+ SJ_J More than a month ago
3 9n Prefer not to say
(25 ]
3. Was your cho ice for U.S. Representative mostly a vote:
r7o1 .- in favor of your cand idate
~ 2.: against his opponents
Please go to
'3 3r a random se lection
Page 2
1 9.1 Prefer not to say
(21 )

4. Voters sometimes change their minds about candidates

during a political campaign. Who was your original
choice for Senator?
:'.'io1 O Ted Wilson
? 2-0 Orrin Hatch
30 Another Candidate
, 90 Prefer not to say

-----------------------1 ,

+

Page 2

12. How did you just vote on Proposition 2 regarding
c:-:impensation and expenses of legislators?
: :i 17.,1(] For
: i 2-C] Against
Did not vote on this proposition
Cannot remember how I voted
i.:..
SO Prefer not to say

18. During the next year, do you think your family 's finances
will:

40"7o1 O Get better

15 20 Get worse

3n
., 4n

3• 30 Stay the same
15 80 Don't know

(33]

(2

19. Which best describes your employment status?
13. How did you just vote on Proposition 3 which would
5(J73 O Employed by someone else
require members of the legislature to continue to reside
1+ 20 Self-employed
in their districts during their terms of office?
5 30 Unemployed
-~ } _,1 O For
13 40 Homemaker
::; 20 Against
4- 50 Student
:\ 30 Did not vote on this proposition
Retired
13
40 Cannot remember how I voted
i 90 Prefer not to say
(34]
3 SO Prefer not to say
(28), _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

·so

1

20. How worried are you about losing your job in the near
14 . How did you just vote on Proposition 4 which would

future?
remove the prohibition against corporate officers. agents
7'ia1 O Very ·worried
or employees from holding office in the town, city or
IC'\ 20 Somewhat worried
county which granted their business license.
'74- 30 Not very worried
[35]
-7-7,,1O For
~1
20 Against
l;;
30 Did not vote on this proposition
21. On most political matters do you consider yourself:
2.. 40 Cannot remember how I voted
i 11~1 O Strongly Conservative
i.;.. SO Prefer not to say
(29 lf3 20 Moderately Conservative
::.i 30 Neither, Middle of the road
i o 40 Moderately Liberal
15. Generally speaking do you consider yourself to be:
3 50 Strongly Liberal
,.,-7,, 1 O Strong Democrat
7 90 Don 't know, No Opinion
[36]
·/- 2[7 Not so strong Democrat
30 Independent leaning Democrat
, 40 Independent
22. In general, which do you rely on most for news about
, 50 Independent leaning Republican
politics and current events?
,. 60 Not so strong Republican
52.'?.,10 Television
:..-: 7 O Strong Republican
31 20 Newspapers
~
80 Other _ _ _ __
30 Magazines
-3 SO Prefer not to say
(30] 7 40 Radio
iD SO Other_____
[37]

+

6. Compared to a year ago, is your family's economic
situation:
7:1 1,1
Better today
."'>'.: 20 Worse today
+z.. 30 About the sa-:ie
i

n

23. How often do you read the newspaper?
;.;7.!i,,1 O Everyday
ZD 20 A few times a week
(31] 9 30 Once a week
,., 40 Less than once a week
4 SO Don't read the newspaper

17. Were you out of work or laid off at any time during the

last 12 months?
·1'701 -C]Yes
?! 2n No

[32]

Please go to
Page 3

[38]

Page 3

24. Marl< an "X" to show your general attitude toward each
29. Was your 1981 family income:
of the following people. As of today, what is your
;5':01 O Under S10,000
I'+ 20 S10,000-S14,999
impression of:
Don't 33 3.Q S15,000-S24,999
UnFavorable favorable Know 3 i 40 S25,000-S50,000
(5 1]
52-,"lri 1. 0 ~1o 3. Q3C.t1a [Il39] l 50 Over SS0,000
A. Walter Mondale
8 . Jake Gam
, I 1. 0 Z3 3. 0 G 8. [ ! 1 ) 1 1 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 2"? 1. Qta2-3.Q108.~]
C. Jimmy Carter
49 1. O 2.9 3. O z;z....8. [!2] 30. What. if any, is your religious preference?
D. George Bush
E. Edward Kennedy
z.4 1. O (I) 1 3. O 9 8. (!t3] 9%1 O Protestant
F. James Watt
3:z.. 1. O 44 3. O Z.4 8. [3!4] 7 20 Catholic
G. Scott Matheson
74 1. 0 ZO 3. 0 ic 8. [!51 74 3.Q Mormon
H. Ronald Reagan
1. O Z..tf 3. O 5 8. (!6]
i 40 Jewish
7 50 No Preference. no religious affiliation
(52]
3 90 Prefer not to say
25. In your opinion, is it proper for candidates to use their
church positions as political qualifications?
, , 1J-, 1 O Yes, it is proper
31. Do you consider yourself active in the practice of your
reUgious preference?
7.1 2.Q No, it is improper
i..,,qo/,1O Yes
L- 30 I haven 't thought much about this
(47] i O 20 Kind of
;_ 8.Q I have no opinion
i't' 3.Q Not very
5 8.Q Not applicable
26. Are you or anyone living in your household a union
3 90 Prefer not to say
(53]
member?
2.2.%1 O Yes
32. Are you:
""7 "1 2.Q No
; 9.Q Prefer not to say
[48] ,31~ 1 O Mexican American
- 20 Black
i 3.Q Oriental
27. What was the last grade in school you attended?
95 40 Caucasian
1 2."!o
l '{ - 7-'t
(54]
-i f~1 O Did not graduate from high school
1 5.Q American Indian
~ 'l
25 - 3 ~t
;:.3 20 Completed high school
LO
:',.:, -i pt
?,"'t 3-CJ Some college but not four years
[
49]
33.
What
year
were
you
born?
_
i_7_
+5 · s+
(55-561
3 :z.. 40 Four years of college or more

, z..

; z..

28. Do you own the place where you now live, or do you pay
rent?
,7'1;;10 Own
, 7 20 Rent
~ 3-CJ Uve rent-free

55-

~t

34. Are you
$3",o1 0 Male
47 20 Female

(57]

(50]
Thank You!

Time of interview _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

(Military Time)

(1-2)

Your S c h o o l - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

[3]

County where interview occurred _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

(4-5]

Voting prec inct number _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

(6-B]

02581

Case I.D. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Respondents Sex _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

(9-12]
(13]

